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INTRODUCTION

Conflict between Islam and Christianity punctuated the
entire Middle Ages.

The West was alternately marching on crusades

into the stronghold of Islam and struggling to maintain its borders
against various attacking tribes from the East.

But, 'West and

East lived in closest quarters in Spain where sultans, caliphs and
emirs ruled for almost eight centuries (711-1492).

During those

eight hundred years Muslim Spain produced a culture more brilliant
than anything known to early medieval Europe.

Poetry was its most

exalted means of communication, - Its culture reached its heights in
medicine and astrology.

Less emphasis was placed on philosophy and

theology because their speculations appeared heretical in the eyes
of the highly orthodox, sometimes fanatical population,

Nonetheless

the civilization produced Avicenna, Averroes and Khaldun.
gave Europe much of what it knew of Greek philosophy.

It

But, despite

its glittering culture, this great society was not matched by a
political system stable enough to avoid the eventual destruction of
Islam in the Iberian peninsula.

The last gasp of this empire was

the small state of Granada in the southeast corner of the peninsula.
Between 146.1 and 1492, its fall, the state was plagued with almost
incessant political instability.
stranger to Muslims in Spain.

However, such instability was no

The history' of Islam’s presence there

demonstrated over and over again instability in its political system

iv
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V

Even as early as the invasion of Spain in 711, the Muslim
empire \^as plagued by internal discord which resulted from the
Sunnite-Shiite religious controversy over the rightful heir to
Mohammed.

The Shiite sect held the Ali Husayn, grandson of the

Prophet, should have held the title of caliph rather than the
Umayyads,

The Berbers, an African tribe, had fought and defeated

the Arabs as the Arabs swept west through North Africa.

But, later

the Berbers converted to Islam as a matter of conscience and
joined the Arabs in the invasion of the Iberian peninsula.

How

ever, the two groups fought among each other and this was another
source of discord in Spain.

The Muslim defeat at the Battle of

Tours (732) was decisive, at least in part, because of a rebellion
of Berbers against their Arab rulers in Spain and Africa which
commanded the attention of the Muslim army.

The Berbers were dis

turbed by the religious laxity of the Arabs and the lack of
orthodoxy and obedience to the Koran that they saw in Spain.

This

belief sent them to battle often.
The Berbers and the mass of the people generally were very
enthusiastic Mohammedans, so that it was unsafe to express
one’s opinions contrary to the faith or even to engage openly
in certain philosophical studies, for they were regarded as
heretical.1
This civil war was followed by an eleven year religious war be
tween Sunnite and Shiite factions.
Stability was reestablished in Spain only under Abd-er—

•'"Charles E . .Chapman, A History of Spain (New York: The Free
Press, 1918), p. 49.
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Rahman I (755-788) who, having fled there after the fall of the
Umayyad dynasty of which he was an heir, quelled many rebellions
before he insured his hegenoray in most of the Iberian peninsula.
Hakem I, lacking the degree of piety desired by his subjects, was
plagued by religious uprisings and a push for independence in
Toledo.

Abd-er-Rahman III (912-961) pursued an eight year was

against that separatist movement and a seven year campaign against
various Christian citizens in his empire.— Hisham III was dethroned
in 1031 and the empire disintegrated into small tribal states.
It was during this factionalized period that Muslim culture reached
an height at Cordova which boasted paved streets and a luxurious
mosque.

—

The Spanish Muslim tribes, numbering at one time twentythree, fought among themselves but none could gain dominance.

The

Christians began pressing the factionalized Muslims who requested
aid from their coreligionists in Africa in 1090.
Responding to the plea of their brothers-in-faith, the
Almoravides (religious men), a part of the Berber people who con
trolled northwest Africa, attacked and pushed the Christians
back to Leon; a less threatening position.

The Almoravides were

hardy tribal men but they were soon to succumb to the succulent
pleasures of the more fertile peninsula as well as the beauty of
its literature and architecture.

Their dominance in Muslim Spain

was only about forty years (1091-1125), but, in its early, more
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radical phase, upsetting to the cultured society of Andalus, as
the Muslims called their Spanish empire.

But, soon political

matters were back to normal, namely, tribal states and inter
necine war.
Andalus.

Once more, in 1146, Berbers from the south invaded

The Almohades, another branch of the Berber people

represented a combination of political and religious elements which
were far from those in Spain.

They were uncultured puritans

believing in the strict unity of God and the uselessness of all
knowledge but the Koran.. They gave their brethren in Andalus a
strong dose of orthodoxy.2
It is little wonder that Muslim Spain seems to present so
many attitudes toward religious and social organization given its
history of pressure from Christian Spain and cathartic invasions
from Berber Africa.
After the defeat at Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212, Muslim
dominance of any kind was at a low.
south remained.

Only a small state in the

It was all that was left of Andalus.

Banu-Nasr, who negotiated with the Christians, received
the state of Granada.

He began the Nasrid dynasty which reigned

in Granada from 1232-1492.

However, the history of the Nasrids

was no more stable than other Muslim political experience in Spain.
Six rulers held power at least twice (see Appendix I) and Mohammed
VIII actually sat on the sultan’s throne three times.

^For further information see Edward Salmon, Imperial Spain (New
York: Henry Holt., 1931), pp. 21-32.
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With the accession of Abu-l-hasan, the first ruler studied
here, the last epoch of Muslim presence in the Iberian peninsula
began.

When he took the throne he inherited a tradition of political

instability which began with the tribes of the Arabian deserts.
The culture of Islam did little to mitigate those factors.
Thus, the entire history of Islam in Spain was the story of
political instability.

This was true also of the last epoch of

Muslim control in the peninsula,

It is this instability and its

causes that I shall examine here.
The story of the last years of Granada is one of decay and
destruction.

It involves inevitable forces and foolish men.

there is much that can be learned from such a subject.
within man’s power to arrest decline and cure decay.

But,

It may be
While birth

of ideas, concepts or habits are interesting topics, they are no
more illustrative to human action than the history of decline.

And

yet, history often slights this story of decay in favor of a more
optimistic inquiry into birth and growth.
History has always been far more engrossed by the problems of
origins than by those of decline and fall. When studying any
period, we are always looking for the promise of what the next
is to bring....The questions imposing themselves upon the mind
have been concerned with the rise of families, nations, king
doms, social forms or ideas.-'
The mistakes the Nasrids made and an analysis of the problems
they faced can be instructive as long as comparison to the present
does not become too strict.

3 j 4 Huizinga, The Waning of the Middle Ages (Garden City, New
York: Doubleday and Co., 19547, P* i.
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Beyond this, the events of 1461-1492 are dramatic.

They

involve interesting people ..with various motivations facing
cataclysmic circumstances.

The story of death is more dramatic

that that of birth because it has the tragedy of all ends.

There

is a tragic element in this story that sets the fatalism of Islam
ic historians in dark relief.
The history of Granada is complicated less because of the
intricacies of the actual events than because of the men who
wrote it.

The final stage of Muslim Granada is inextricably

bound in two cosmologies.

Its history is written generally by

Spanish historians to whom it is a great conquest by a superior
Spain with God on its side, or Islamic historians to whom Granada
is a sigh and a tear in the story of fate’s capricious destruction,
or by various antiquarians and experts in other fields of history
who are drawn to it because of its poetic potentialities.

Each

see Granada in a different manner, but somehow none seem to see it
objectively.

To the Spaniard, Granada was, quite simply, defeated

by the superiority of a united Spain.

To the Muslim, Granada

lost the favor of God who only used Spain to fulfill His will.
To further complicate matters, the whole epoch is surrounded
by tales of doubtful truth; sometimes these tales are contradictory.
This is so not only because it involves a Spanish national experience
and is therefore romanticized, but also because Islamic sources
are essentially chronicles which are more interested in a good story
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X

than the facts.

For example, H. E. Watts^ places the size of

Granada’s army at fifty thousand well-armed, well-trained men, while
a resident of the city in those thirty years describes the army
in this way:
§

The armies of Abu-l-hasan having greatly increased in number,
he decided to review them. To this effect he caused his
architects to erect him a platform out of the Alhambra, or the
castle of Granada. The review began on...March 24, A.D. 1478,
and the troops ceased, not passing daily before him til...April
24, A.D. 1478, when the review was completed.5
This is undoubtably a more enjoyable image but it is of little use
to historical investigation.
Further difficulties are presented by the destruction of
masses of Islamic sources by the Christians after their victory.
This has led many an historian astray on matters even of chronology.
In numerous volumnes^ dealing with the last stage of the Reconquista
it is stated that Abu-l-hasan attacked and took a Christian fortress
called Zahara.

In retribution the Marquess of Cadiz captured the

important Moorish city of Alhama.

This was a crucial exchange

of warlike blows because it marked the opening of the Granadine
wars.

7

However, Charlotte Yonge' says that the city of Alhama was

^■H. E. Watts, The Christian Recovery of Spain (New York: G. P.
Putnam’s Sons, 1894), PP- 291-92.
_ f S
«•"
2Sidi Hasan as cited in al-Maqqari, The History of the Mohammedan
Dynasties in Spain (London: Oriental Translation Fund of Great
Britain, 1840), II, 369*
^For example, W. Montgomery Watt and Pierre Cachia, A History
of Islamic Spain (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1965), p. 129.
7Charlotte Mary Yonge, The Story of the Christians and Moors
in Spain (New York: Crystal Palace Press, 1903), p. 202.
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taken before Zahara which would change the whole complexion of the
war since it would make Spain the aggressor.

The author may be

mistaken since her’s seems to be the only work that makes such a
contention.

The point is not that one author was mistaken,

but that such mistakes are easy in this field, given the sources
with which an historian can work.
Varying interpretations are to be expected in any historical
discussion.

However, the question of the order of succession

presents a more basic difficulty which underscores the problems
posed by Granada’s muddled history.

Some works® contend that Abu-

l-hasan returned to the throne of Granada after his deposition
because his son had been captured by Ferdinand and a power vacuum
existed in the state.

He is said to have ruled for two years under

these circumstances (see Appendix I).

However, al-Maqqari argues

i

that Abu-l-hasan retired in favor of his brother Az-zaghal who
assumed the throne.

It is possible that Abu-l-hasan did rule for

two years of this interim (1483-1485) and Az-zaghal, his brother,

!

served the remaining year (1485-1486) until the reassertion of Abu
’Abdillah.

However, al-Maqqari does not acknowledge such a fact.

Thus, the question of succession in those troubled times is at least
partially in doubt.

To pick through such contradictions and choose

what is good history and what is good literature is the basic
problem of any work dealing with this topic.

®For example, Philip K. Hitti, History,of the Arabs (New York;
Macmillan Publishing Co., 1951), P« 549.
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In general, I have turned to PhilipK. Hitti’s History of the
Arabs when such problems arise.

I have also tried to keep a

diced eye on the more literary dealings in this subject.

jaun

Much was

written on this topic around the turn of the century*? that takes
a more literary approach; although generally reliable, they are
confused on some important specifics.

Poetry and tales have been

used, but I have always attempted to authenticate their content from
more historical sources.

In general I have given more credence

to Arab scholars, e.g., Hitti and von Grunebaum, than western
sources since I wish to see the event in terms of Muslim inadequacies.
This, then, is the method by which I have tried to extract the true
series of events that led to the downfall of Muslim GrcLJEisdci«
A note on varient spelling will be helpful to those who wish
to pursue the subject further.

Each Muslim figure can be found

i

under his Arabic name or various Spanish spellings, e.g., Abu-lhasan in Spanish texts is Muley Kacen.

Also, it is necessary to

8

beware of distinction between Az-zaghal and his nephew Abu tAbdillah,
also known as Boabdil, since both have the nephew’s name in Arabic.
I have attempted to use Arabic names whenever possible.

In the

case of the similarly named uncle and nephew, I have chosen to use
the nickname of the uncle, Az-zaghal, which is also used in some
contemporary Muslim texts.

Accent marks used here correspond to

those used in al-Maqqari’s Mohammedan Dynasties in Spain.

^For example, Roger B. Merriman’s Rise of the Spanish Empire.
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CAUSES OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY
IN MUSLIM GRANADA

The story of the fall of Andalus will amply demonstrate the
role played by political instability in the demise of Islam’s last
stronghold in the West.
are less obvious.

The factors that led to this instability

The history of Andalus involves inevitable forces

that created instability, but they are difficult to separate and
analyze because they worked together to produce the tragic fall of
such a glittering society.

These factors fall into two broad

categories: first, those institutions of government that so often
determine the quality of a political system; second, the myriad of
attitudes, habits and economics that makes a culture.

However, these

two categories must not be seen as mutually exclusive since they
work on each other.

A culture, the attitudes of those to be ruled,

will not for long accept a government which does not meet its
standards.

On the other hand, institutional government can, through

force or persuasion, change those attitudes.
The sultan’s throne embodied all the legitimate power of the
realm.

Although plagued by foreign enemies and ambitious nobles,

once a ruler had been chosen he held all power.

There was no con

cept of separation of powers, even to the point that the sultan re
presented both the state and the faith.

Islam never struggled with

the problem of the ’’two swords” as the West did.

The ruler was

quite literally a despot as long as he could hold his throne.

1
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This total power created two important attitudes in Islam5s
rulers.

These sultans looked upon their countries as personal

estates so they gave full vent to their personal ambitions without
concern for the welfare of the state.
ation of the most demeaning sort.

They also demanded subjug

However, there were those citizens,

members of ancient tribes, who found it difficult to sacrifice pride
to the power of the ruler.
But with all their greatness, their clemency, their generosity,
the...(rulers)...were/universally hated. The obsequious sub
mission exacted by their office was extremely repugnant to the
native independence of the Arab. Among the aristocracy the spirit
of insubordination was always strong and intensified by the vigilance and severity with which it was surpressed, by the memory of
past renown, and by tlie hope-of future revolution that might
open a new avenue to ihe throne.10
The result was frequeny and destructive tribal revolution.

Even in

times of domestic peaci,
cl the tribes were only partially reconciled
I
to the government,
Tribal warfare had long been a problem to the internal
security of Muslim Spain.,

When these tribes constituted almost

the entire army, they presented an even greater threat to domestic
peace.

The able vizier under Abd-er-Rahman III (912-961) attempted

to solve the problem by reorganizing the army.
So, for instance, the general of an army would have under his
orders a portion of each tribe, and a captain would seldom
command soldiers of his own tribe, by these means the wound
was cauterized, civil dissensions were somewhat allayed, and
peace, if not friendship, was established, between the Arabian
tribes inhabiting the western district, although they not

10S, P. Scott, History of the Moorish Empire in Europe, III
(Philadelphia: j. B. Lippincott Co., 1904), p. 640.
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infrequently broke out in other parts of Andalus where the same
precautions had not been taken.
This plan was reasonably successful.

However, when the Nasrids faced

the problem of tribal factionalism it was no longer useful because
members of the tribes avoided military service and established
themselves in various quarters of the capital. ^

The tribes com

posed an active and disruptive element in the politics of the state.
They did, in fact, depose Mohammed IX in 1429 because he persecuted
the tribes and restored Mohammed VIII.

The Abencerrages, one of the

three major tribes in Granada, had supported Mohammed VIII, so when
his brother deposed him, the tribe fell out of favor.

Mohammed IX,

fearing this potentially rebellious tribe, carried on a systematic
policy of persecution bordering on elimination of the tribe.
Mohammed IX’s fears were justified because in 1429} after only two
years in power, the Abencerrages deposed him and restored their
supporter Mohammed VIII.

Thus, the tribal factions were a political

fact of life for the sultan.

The manner in which he handled these

dements was one of the factors that determined the length of his
reign.
The ruler refused to share his power either as secular or
religious leader.

Islam’s political system was always weak because

it owed its potency to the quality of the ruler who was given

•^Al Mansur Ibn Ali Amir as cited in K. Bhargava, A Survey of Islamic
Culture and Institutions (Allahabad, India: Kitab Mahal. 196l), p. 22.
12Scott, Moorish Empire in Europe, II, p. 525.
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absolute control.

In such a system, if the ruler is incompetent,

the fate of the state is misrule and disaster.

If such a system

also fails to provide for an orderly transfer of power, its fate
is chronic instability.
Muslim Spain, and more generally all of Islam, never settled
the question of rightful succession.

When Mohammed began his

preaching, he did so among the tribes of the Arabian desert whose
process of succession was seniority.
brother to brother.^

Thus, power passed from

After the death of the Prophet, the question

of the leadership of Islam was of immediate importance.

Islam never

made any distinction between religion and the state so that the pro
blem was further complicated when Muslims suddenly found themselves
with an empire to govern.

If only Mohammed had made some pronounce

ment concerning succession this problem would have been solved,
since in Islam his word is law.

However, he did not, and soon after

his death Islam broke into factions, each supporting some pretender
to Mohammed*s position.

The bitterest and most permanent division

on the question of rightful succession exists even today in the
Sunnite-Shiite controversy.

This inability to create a consensus

concerning succession was the cause of bitter, factuous wars which
continually weakened Islamic power, especially when external pressures
demanded internal cohesion as, for example, in Granada.

’'Never was

there an Islamic issue which brought about more bloodshed than the.

^Claude Cahen, "The Body Politic” in Unity and Variety in Muslim
Civilization, ed. by Gustave von Grunebaum (Chicago; University of
Chicago Press, 1955), p. 133.
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caliphate.
Islam inherited the seniority system of succession from the
Arabian tribes, but it was not generally accepted and soon the
hereditary system came into use.

It is almost natural that a father

wishes to see his son rule in his place and very soon this became
another source of tension in the political world of Islam.

Each

caliph sought to put his son on the throne, but the tribal seniority
system intervened.

Of the fourteen Umayyad caliphs, only four were

followed by their sons.-^
In Spain, however, the pattern of succession became generally
hereditary.

This would have gone a-long way to stabilize Spain’s

political system by insuring peaceful succession, but the theory had
been revised and weakened.
...Since the advent of Abd-er~Rahman I a son ■
— not always the
eldest, for each emir had claimed the right to choose the one
most fitted to govern — had regularly succeeded to his father.
It was not, as time would prove, the perfect solution to the
problem since a son so passed over became inevitably a focus of
discontent and knew strong temptation to fight for the in
heritance., ..16
Thus, seniority had fallen into disuse, although it remained a
legitimate theory available to ambitious men, and hereditary
succession was complicated by not necessarily passing to the eldest
son.
The sultanate was totally powerful which made the men who

■^Ai-Snahrastani, a twelfth century historian of religions as
cited in Hitti, Arabs. p. 139.

•^Ibid., pps 281-82,
1f i

William Atkinson, A History of Spain and. Portugal (Baltimore:
Penguin Books, I960), p. 49.
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served in it capricious and demanding.

This tremendous power was

not handled with the delicacy it deserved.

After the death of a

ruler, sons and brothers and tribes bickered until someone proved
most powerful.

All these inadequacies were never checked by the

cultural milieu in which, and for which, it functioned.
The cultural factors that allowed such an institutional
structure were particularly Islamic.
the harem system.

Most alien to the West was

It added emotion to political considerations.

The harem had disruptive tendencies in the Arab system. _It was
close to government and it was the source of bitterness since
it involved the .jealousies of wives.

At times in the political

annals of Islam, dominant wives actually ruled their husbandsf
kingdom.^

It also meant there were numerous sons, all of whom had

a legitimate claim to the throne.

Fears of mothers that their sons

would be passed over prompted them to interfere in politics and
send their children to war to win the sultan's power.

There was

no social law to prevent these potential jealousies from flaring
into war.

There was little injunction in Arabic culture against

familial combat.

n0ur business is to make raids on our neighbor and

Irt
our own brother, in case we find none to raid but a brother.'1-1-0
Thus, there was little in either the Islamic power structure or

-^Bhargava, Islamic Culture and Institutions, p. 103.
18Ai_Qutami, a poet of the early Umayyad dynasty as cited in
Hitti, Arabs, p. 25.
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culture to prevent such political fragmentation.
Muslim society was warlike outside the family too.

Andalus

had, because of the continued influence of the Umayyad dynasty,
retained much more of the Arabic element in its culture than in the
East.

The Umayyad dynasty fell in the East in 750, but it continued

in Spain until the Berber invasions in the eleventh century as a
result of Abd-er~Rahmanfs government in Spain after fleeing from
the East.

This left a definite Arabic stamp on Andalusian society

which meant a glorification of war and a predilection toward
prideful audacity.

For example, the poet Sa?id in the ninth century

defined the Arabic idea of warfare.

"...Sprung from a race of

champions, whose blood had never mixed with that of a foreign
race, he attacks his enemies impetuously, as befits'~an Arab...."19
This Arabic element also aided the relaxed attitude Andalus
had toward orthodoxy.
Mow the Umayyad caliphate in the heartlands was characterised
by the dominance of Arab elements rather than of the dis
tinctively Islamic. The Uma.yyads were practising Muslims, but
they did not show the same deference as the Abbasids did to the
self-appointed exponents of Islamic religion and religious law.^0
Suspicion concerning the orthodoxy of Muslim Spain had much to do
with the two invasions of fanatically religious elements from
Africa.

Arabic predominance in Andalusian culture, then, meant a

more warlike and prideful society in which religion was less

^Armand Abel, "Spain: Internal Division," in Unity and Variety,
ed. by von Grunebaum, p. 215.
^%att and Cachia, Islamic Spain, p. 166.
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emphasized.

After the doses of orthodoxy from the two Berber

invasions, Muslims in Spain developed a culture in which the two
elements existed side by side.
Culture, then, gave the political system many potential
heirs with the will and social sanction to fight for power which
only added to the institutional difficulties Islam’s politics
faced.

There is one element that is at once an institution and

molder of culture: the population.

When many men all claim a

right to the throne, there must be a final arbitrator.

With this

political confusion it seems obvious that an important claim to
legitimacy was public opinion, but not in the modern sense.

Since

these circumstances often resulted in.warfare, the number of follow
ers a pretender could muster was often the difference between
victory and defeat.

Thus, the only real claim to the throne was

through the allegiance of the citizenry in strategic cities through
out the state.

It is almost paradoxical that the Islamic system,

so absolute and repressive in most cases, should, in Spain, find
ib£>e_Lj. ao the mercy of those xt was to govern.
Since the citizenry meant so much to the stability of the
state, it is important to tmderstand why it did not accomplish
solidarity.

If the people had wanted peaceful transfer of power,

they could have demanded it and insured it by allying themselves
with one man.

However, they fought the suicidal wars of pretenders

to the throne and their allegiance was sold to the highest bidder.
Why, then, did citizens of Andalus not provide the social cement
that could have meant stability to its political system?
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Cultural elements were intensified by the high concentration
of Muslims in Granada.
corner of Spain.
four

The Reconquista had forced them into this

It was crowded, some estimates say by three or

m i l l i o n s

and very consciously Arabic-Islamic in tenor.

Granada was filled with bitter men who had lost their homes.

They

had been pushed from central Spain by a religious crusade and in
rebellion they emphasized all those characteristics that had made
them anathema to the Christians.

Thus, the culture of Granada

was consciously Muslim.
The population was capricious and fickle in nature; willing
to give their allegiance to those who would give them the most and
ask the least.

"Life was with them one long carnival, and the season

of revelry was prolonged until the enemy was at the gate.,?^2

But,

this only defines the nature of the citizenry; it does not explain
it.

Why were they so?
Granada had fertile valleys and thriving industry to occupy

its people.

However, the years of the Reconquista swelled the

population with exiles and disinherited nobles.
there was no place in the economy of Granada.
and eventually poor.

For these people
This left many idle

There was a vast gulf between the rich, who

revelled in the luxury their wealth purchased, and the poor who
01
'-•^Chapman, History of Spain, p. 200.
^William Prescott, Ferdinand and Isabella. I (Philadelphia:
J. B. LIppincott Co., 1837), p. 3&8.
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had only diversions to keep their minds from their
division resulted in two things.

p o v e r t y . ^3

This

First, it produced a large dis

satisfied element whose allegiance could be bought with a promise
and' whose ability to anticipate the consequences of their actions
only reached to the next festival.

Second, concentration of

wealth at one pole generally disrupts industry, even in the articles
that Granada produced, e.g., silk.
When wealth is concentrated at one pole, luxury breaks up the
equilibrium by diminishing the manufacture of articles of use
and increasing that of articles of luxury....The more wealth is
divided, the more consumption and consequently production increase.
This only increased the poverty of the masses and made them more
volatile, ,
The alienation of the poor extended beyond economics.

If

there is a social cement between classes, even poverty can be en
dured without rancor.

But the aristocracy, through its fascination

with intellectual pursuits, soon lost all understanding and sympathy
for the values of their less fortunate fellow citizens.^5

The

masses often took the reflections and actions of their rulers as un
orthodox.

For example, Haken I (796-822), lost the loyalty of his

subjects because he lacked the necessary degree of religious piety.
23

Chapman, History of Spain, pp. 200-01.

^ G . Salvioli as cited in Ferdinand Lot, The End of the Ancient
World and the Beginnings of the Middle Ages (New York: Harper and
Row, Publishers, 1931), p. 74.

25Armand Abel, "Spain: Internal Division," in Unity and Variety,
ed. by von Grunebaum, p. 222.
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Because of the nature of Islamic society, belief in the orthodoxy
of the ruling eliue was vital to loyalty.
Mohammed...|aroseJ... in a society without a state....Con
sequently, the social law was an integral part of the
religious law, and respect for the social law an integral
part of submission to Allah....It was to have the consequence
that the Muslim would require of his political organization a
certain perfection; if this was lost, the principle of obedience
which he owed to it was also l o s t . 2 °
This economic, social,and intellectual alienation combined to make
the masses in Granada an enemy of political stability.

It was

their allegiance that was the ultimate source of legitimacy for
any ruler.

Their vacillation sacrificed domestic tranquility.

Thus it was that in Muslim Spain politics and culture
combined to create instability.
which noble refused to give.

The ruler demanded obedience

A tradition of succession was

never established so that many could legitimately claim the throne.
Meanwhile, the harem system produced many aspirants and Arabic
cultural elements urged them to war.

In this factuous system the

last claim to authority was the loyalty of the citizenry, but it
too engaged in internecine battles rather than wielding its power
for domestic peace.
These, then, are the factors that caused instability.

In

the chapters that follow they will reappear and play their role
in the fall of a Muslim state.

Claude Cahen, "The Body Politic," in Unity and Variety, ed.
by von Grunebaum, p. 133«

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

SUCCESSION BY SENIORITY
AND TRIBAL JEALOUSIES

For the greater part of Abu-l-hasan*s reign (1461-1482) he
faced a complex of difficulties inherent in Muslim politics.

Even

as he declared himself ruler of the state of Granada, he found the
question of succession made him sultan only of the capital city
which he occupied.

A Muslim chronicler in the capital explains

the circumstances:
When it came to the reign of Abu-l-hasan, one of the Sultans
of that family, public opinion declared against him, especially
when a brother of his named Az-zaghal, received the oath of
allegiance and was proclaimed at M a l a g a . ^7
Az-zaghal had some claim to the throne because hereditary succession
in Andalus did not provide that the eldest son necessarily ascended
to the throne.

This attempt to become sultan was not as illegitimate

as it would have been in a system demanding the rule of the eldest
son.

The legitimacy of his claim may have aided his decision to

rebel and it certainly increased the popular support for his cause.
Az-zaghal,s decision plainly demonstrates the kind of political
confusion caused by Islands failure to develop a solid tradition
of succession.
At Malaga, the second city of the state, Az-zaghal was pro
claimed sultan due, chiefly, to the political maneuverings of the
A M

£

^

'Sidi Hasan as cited in al-Maqqari, Mohammedan Dynasties. II,
p. 369.

12
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Christian.28

Their motivations are unclear but the outcome of their

action appeared obvious.

Once more, it seemed, power would not be

transfered smoothly and peacefully.

Granada divided into two armed

camps and prepared for a civil war.
However, suddenly, Az-zaghal left Malaga and journeyed
/
to Grenada to make peace with Abu-l-hasan.
for such an act are not clear.

Az-zaghal*s motivations

It seems obvious that he had the

greatest number of citizens bound to him by oath and could have won
his claim if he had been willing to risk a long civil war.
s ources29

Some

attribute to him the greatest foresight to see the coming

of a powerful Reconquista and a magnanimous nature which valued the
security of the state more than power.
charitable.

Perhaps this is a little too

There is no doubt that Az-zaghal lived up to his name

which means "the Valiant” but to say that he could anticipate coming
events and that he had a modern concept of the state and its welfare
is to argue- from the present into the past.

Certainly a civil war

at that time would have further weakened Granada when faced with
.Christian pressure, but there is a great deal of' doubt that Az-zaghal
considered such an eventuality in making his decision, since the
newly-united Spain had made no new military advances and did not
pose too great a threat to the existence of Granada.

It is possible

2% b i d .
29R0ger Bigelow Merriman, Rise of the Spanish Empire. I (New
York: Macmillan Co., 1918), p. 301.
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he merely wished to avoid the bloodshed of what probably would
have been a long civil war.
Peace was not assured, however, by this agreement between
/
Abu-l-hasan, the new ruler of Granada, and his brother.

The

Christians who had elevated Az-zaghal at Malaga continued to refuse
recognition of Abif-1-hasan as sultan.

This stalemate continued until

...the people of Malaga rose in arms and proclaimed also
Abil-l-hasan, whereby the civil war was concluded, and that
Sultan...became the supreme master of all the Mohammedan
dominions in Andalus.™
This kind of political factionalism was, more than any other, the
single cause of instability in Granadine society.
/

So, Abu-l-hasan began his reign.
prepared for war, his favorite sport.

He bolstered the army and'
Although historical treat

ment of him^-*- concerns his role as a military leader, he faced
some difficulty in domestic matters.

Following a long tradition of

Islamic politics, his reign was essentially repressive.

He, like

most Islamic rulers, demanded much in money and obedience from
his citizens.
The people of Granada, moreover, complained to the Sultan of
his Wizir and civil officers, who, they said, oppressed them
with unwonted tyranny and injustice. This increased the dis
content still more, and things went so far that the inhabitants
of Granada loudly demanded the removal of the obnoxious Wizir and
the other public functionaries; and as their petitions were dis
regarded by Abu-l-hasan, new scenes of trouble...ensued.22

2^Sidi Hasan as cited in al-Maqqari, Mohammedan Dynasties. II, 369.
2-^Scott, Moorish Empire in Europe. II, 541.
on

&

&

-^Sidi Hasan as cited in al-Maqqari, Mohammedan Dynasties, II, 371.
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This repression would have meant little to the stability of the
state but the Berber invasions and nobles exiled by the Reconquista
combined to make the society volatile.

There was a legacy in the

form of prideful tribes who dislike the Sultan and his power which
further complicated an explosive situation.
These tribes were an element in Granada’s political system
that threatened the Sultanas power and the stability of the state.
It was, therefore, necessary that he deal with them.

The method

f

Abu-l-hasan used to stop the agitation of the tribes was, as time
would prove, no solution.
Granada had three major tribes: the Gomeres, the Zegris and
the

Abencerrages.

33

Many had fled to Granada after defeat at the

hands of the Reconquista, for example, the Zegris migrated from
Cordova.

They all chafed under their sultan, cursed their poverty

and mourned their lost land.

But, the Abencerrages had long been

in Granada and was experienced in the ways of civil disorder and
usurpation, for example, they deposed Mohammed IX in 1429.

Because

of their revolutionary activity, they became the focal point of

i

resistance and the tribe with which Abu-l-hasan had to deal.

i

Why Abu-l-hasan chose the method he did is not clear.

What

is clear is that it solved the problem only temporarily.
He called the leaders of the Abencerrages into the large
hall of the Alhambra which still bears the tribe’s name, and there:

33scott, Moorish Empire in Europe. II, 525.
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"By thee were slain, in evil hour/The Abencerrages, Granada’s
f l o w e r . ..."34

question.

The extent of the murders in also a matter of

Poets speak of it in bloody terms, but one

source^

say s

the massacre only involved the death of four members of the tribe.
But, whatever the extent of the murders, the event incurred for Abul-hasan the bitter hatred of the Abencerrages tribe.
tribe allied itself with any who opposed him;

Later this

Abtf-l-hasan had

decided to solve the whole problem though violence which only
deepened tribal hatred for him.
The Sultan was no more diplomatic with Christian Spain than
he had been with the tribes.

Mohammed X had been forced to pay

twelve thousand ducats in 1453 by the peace terms with Castile.
These terms also included an annual tribute that was paid by Saad,
I
Abu-l-hasan’s father, faithfully.
his father’s son in diplomacy.
sum.

4
However, Abu-l-hasan was not

He refused to make delivery of the

Delay in such payments prompted Isabella, in 1476, to send

an ambassador in the name of the Spanish kingdom united by the
marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella.

When confronted by this emissary,

/

Abu-l-hasan is said to have replied, "Tell your sovereigns that
the kings of Granada who paid tribute are dead: our mint now coins
nothing but

s w o r d - b l a d e s . iT3 6

Such a response is indicative of the

-^Contemporary poem concerning the fall of Alhama as cited in
Yonge, Christians and Moors in Spain, p. 260.
35ibid.. p. 249.
36stanley Lane-Poole, The Moors in Spain (New York: G. P. Put
nam’s Sons, 1886), p. 232.
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personality of this man.
violent nature.

He was a man of reckless pride and

Even before he ascended to the throne he had a

reputation for spreading terror through border Christian towns.
He had a hatred for the ’’infidels" and found tribute demeaning.37
Thus* this response from the Sultan opened the diplomatic
hostilities.

He was soon to open real warfare.

Abu-l-hasan*s early reign demonstrates clearly the role of
two factors of instability in Granada’s political system.

Perhaps

the single most destructive weakness, inability to transfer the
sultan’s power without civil was is shown in Az-zaghal’s attempt
to usurp the throne.

Although there wa3 not was, the principle

that a younger son had a right to his father’s throne created some
domestic disruptions.

Adding continuous agitation for any sultan,

i
the tribes in Granada were also a force creating instability.
l-hasan made himself an enemy of the tribes.

Abu-

In times of domestic

strife, he would reget having incurred their hatred.

37scott, Moorish Empire in Europe. II, 541»
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ARABIC-ISLAMIC CULTURE

It seems likely that united Spain would have desired the
destruction of Muslim sovereignty in the Iberian peninsula,
perhaps during the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, even without
the aggressive acts of Granada.

However, it must be remembered

that Christian and Muslim had lived together peacefully during
the long periods that interrupted the Reconquista.

True, there was

new unity for the Spanish nation with the marriage of Ferdinand and
Isabella and unity had been the limiting factor in the successful
conclusion of the crusade.

But, their marriage had only just

taken place in 1479, and there was no assurance that this method
of union would produce more than a personal combination of the
two kingdoms which would not last beyond the lives of the royal
husband and wife.

Both monarchs were so busy with their domestic

problems that they seemed unaware of Granada, even to the extent
j
that Abu-l-hasan received no retribution for his failure to pay
tribute.

When, in 1431, Abu-l-hasan provided the new sovereigns

with a perfect focal point to confirm Spanish unity, the Muslim
kingdom’s fate was sealed.

Without Abu-l-hasanfs aggressive

action, Granada may have remained in the sphere of Islam for some
time but the outcome would probably have only been postponed.
In 1481, the Sultan of Granada attacked and took the fortress
of Zahara east of the capital and in Christian territory (see

18
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Appendix II).

In retrospect it appears a foolish act because it

forced the resumption of the Reconquista and the defeat e-f-Muslim
Granada.

It seems obvious to the historian that there was no

advantage for Granada in such a policy.
only a small corner of Spain.

After all, Granada was

She was religiously anathema to her

larger neighbor who recently had been strengthened by the union
of Castile and Aragon.

It must have been patently clear that

there was nothing to be gained and much lost in violating Christian
territory.

ICven an alfaki (intellectual) of the city of Granada

realized the implications of such an act: ,!Woe is mei

The ruins of

Zahara will fall on our heads; the days of the Moslem empire in
Spain are numbered
Perhaps it was not so obvious that Granada would come to
grief from the attack on Zahara.

t
Abu-l-hasan could have made

his decision to attack from some rational basis which does not
occur to the historian who often demands great perception and
pure reason from men in history.

It is more likely that Abu-

l-hasanfs action was the result of a combination of his perception
of the political situation in Spain and psychological factors which
impelled him toward an aggressive policy.
The apparent inevitability of the defeat of Granada which
seems so obvious with the benefit of time, the great advantage of
f
the historian, was not so obvious to Abu-l-hasan who had no such

-^Prescott, Ferdinand and Isabella. I, 414.
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sight and the political world looked somehat different to him,
Granada was, after all, the richest city in Spain and she sported
a strong army which the Sultan had recently improved.

This army

had, for some time, been repulsing Christian raids into Granadine
territory.

/
Abu-l-hasan had no way of knowing that Christian strategy

was merely to harass the state and avoid direct confrontation.
These sallies against the "infidels” must have convinced the Sultan
of the superiority of his army as well as the cowardice of his
enemy.

Also, he never received any retribution for the audacious

act of refusing to pay tribute.

He must have come to feel that

the Christian rnonarehs were unwilling to clash with him and he would
encounter no resistance in his campaign.

Only to the historian is

it so obvious that the royal marriage in 1479 would bring lasting
unity.

To the Sultan, it must have appeared to be just an attempt

at unity in Spain which would be doomed to failure.

/

However, it is too much a distortion to argue that Abu-lhasan* s decision was purely rational and resulted merely from a
mistaken perception of political trends.

If the Sultan had been

a different type of man, he may, like the alfaki. have been able
to see the long-term disadvantages of such a policy.

Historians

tend to believe -that the actors of history-are purely rational.
There is a mania for crediting great men of the past with
deep laid political schemes the idea of which perhaps never
occured to them....The motives which they obeyed...|may be]...
of so special a kind that every psychological sense is bound
to come to grief.39

39Lot, Ancient World and Middle Ages, p. 30.
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Historical figures are no more or less rational than any individual.
Much of the reason for the Sultan’s decision can only be under
stood in terms of his personality.
Abu-l-hasan was warlike and fierce.
border towns even before he became sultan.

He savagely attacked
Much of his interest in

the early years of his reign was with improvements in the army.
He was haughty and prideful, as his reply to the Christians con
cerning tribute demonstrated.^
...His neighbors had had frequent occasion to acknowledge the
boldness of his undertakings, the rapidity of his movements,-'
and the unrelenting cruelty of his character. The hatred he
bore to the infidels had not been diminished by their gratuitous
interventions in behalf of revels in arms against his authority.
His personal inclinations were towards unremitting hostility.
Given this personality, he may have attacked Zahara even if he
had realized the reality of Spain’s political development.
/

Many aspects of Abu-l-hasan’s personality can be under—
stood in terms of the Arabic-Islamic culture in which he lived.
The Arab glorification of war and impetuosity demonstrated in
Chapter I is best shown here.
was not exclusively theirs.

The pride found among the tribes

i

Abu-l-hasan had his share of vanity.
t.
There is little doubt that Abu-l-hasan’s own personality accentuated

these cultural aspects.
Christians.

Others had lived peacefully with the

Others had paid tribute, but to him it was unbearable.

40see above p. 16.
^Scott, Moorish Empire in Europe. II, 541.
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To him no Arab would accept the humiliation of tribute and all Arabs
should seek the glory of war. ^
With the twin invasions from Africa, religious orthodoxy,
and the consequent Islamic element, had become a second character/

istic of Andalusian society.

Abu-l-hasan*s implaccable hatred for

the Christians may have found some root in this cultural element.
Nevertheless, others had lived in such a culture without harboring
his great hatred.
characteristics.

His own personality once more accentuated these
He had personal reasons for his hate.

It was,

after all, "infidel" Christians who aided Az-zaghal in his revolution
B

against Abu-l-hasan.

Thus, his life experience and personality,

as well as the cultural atmosphere taught him to hate Christians.
Thus, Islamic cultural elements may have contributed to the per
sonality of Abu-l-hasan just as the Arabic element had.

It was

this kind of cultural atmosphere in which the Sultan grew and lived.

i

It was, then, both Abu-l-hasan*s personality, reinforced
by the Arabic-Islamic culture in which he lived, and his perception
of political reality, invalid as it may have been, that led him
to decide to attack Christian Zahara and open the last of the
Granadine wars.
In February 1482, Ponce de Leon, Lord of Cadiz, surprised
the city of Aihama in the night and took xt with xxhxJLs difficulty.

^Lane-Poole, Moors in Spain, p. 232.
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This was an important city of Granada and its loss was a great shock.
But
And
And
Yet

on my soul Alhama weighs,
on my inmost spirit preys;
if the King his land hath lost,
others may have lost the most.
0
Woe is me AlhamaI^

Alhama was a well-fortified city just north of the capital (see
Appedix II).

It had a rich silk trade which until the loss of

the city to the Christians, fed the coffers of Granada.

It also

overlooked the fertile valley of the Vega below the capital, so
that the Christians from this fortress could disrupt normal
a
agricultural activity with impunity. Most important to Abu-lhasan was the humiliation this seizure brought to him.

He

immediately sent his army to retake the city but they were unable
to do so.

The soldiers, stung by their defeat grumbled against

their officers.
It soon became evident, however, that Alhama could not be
taken by force, upon which the soldiers gave license to their
tongues, and began to pour abuse and ridicule upon their own
officers and upon the Wizir who went in command of the army.^tFinally, the attempt to dislodge the Lord of Cadiz had to be
abandoned because a relief army from Seville came to aid the newlyconquered fortress.

Later, the Muslims returned and actually

breached the walls of Alhama.

Many soldiers died in stubborn

hand-to-hand fighting but the Christian forces were numerically

^Contemporary poem as cited in Yonge, Christians and Moors in
Spain, p. 261.
1 1

f

44Sidi Hasan as cited in al-Maqqari, Mohammedan Dynasties. II, 371.
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superior and Granada suffered a second defeat at Alhama.
city’s loss was seen as a disaster.

The

The mortal enemy was only

twenty-five miles from the capital.

/

It was such a catastrophe that Abu-l-hasan is said to have
declared capital punishment for anyone who mentioned the fall of
Alhama. ^

This was not merely an attempt to avoid the humiliation

the Sultan must have felt.
behind this declaration.

There was sound political reasoning
It has already been established that the
/

population was the ultimate source of power for any governor.

Abu-

l-hasan feared that loose talk would cause discontent and threaten
his throne.

Alhama was a diplomatic as well as strategic loss

since the population’s pride as well as his own had been bruised.

/

So, Abu-l-hasan wished to avoid revolution against his rule and hoped
that control of public opinion, at least overt and inflammatory
discussion, would help.
Part of the Sultan’s motivation to begin a campaign into
Gibraltar was to placate his citizens'with glory and booty for
Granada.

The Sultan’s fiery spirit had not been dampened by the

Spanish success.

When faced with an ambush during this campaign,

he was advised to forego his booty of livestock and return to
Granada by another route.

He is said to have replied to this warning:

M ...No true soldier gives up his booty ’
without a blow*

Follow me;

Ac
Yonge, Christians and Moors in Spain, pp. 292-93.
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we will have a brush with these dogs of Christians.”4

He sent

his men into a disasterous battle but he saved his booty.
Several practical, psychological and cultural factors com
bined to produce the decision to take the offensive in the tension
between the two cultures.

Then retaliation came in the form of

the seizure of the vital city of Alhama.

Seeing the jeopardy in

t

which his regime had been placed by his actions, Abu-l-hasan did
what he could to bolster his government.

It was too great a task.

The Sultan was soon to find that his past mistakes would haunt him
in the form of his own son.

But, now he was satisfied that he had

avenged Alhama.

^Charles Morais, Historical Tales (Atlanta: J, B. Lippincott
Co., 1898), p. 119.
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HAREM SYSTEM AND HEREDITARY SUCCESSION

i

Thus far, the important events in the life of Abu-l-hasan
have demonstrated his actions as a general, diplomat, and a
domestic politician as well as some inquiry into his personality
in terms of the culture in which he lived.

Now the narrative

naturally comes to a point that the Sultan appears as a man; a
man whose life is determined as much by how well he slept and the
palatability of his morning meal as by reason.

Some of the

institutions of his private and public life, especially the harem,
created further complications.
/
Abu-l-hasan now had reason to feel secure.

The Christians

had suffered a sound defeat east of the capital at Loja (see
Appendix II).

It seemed that the "infidels” had been stopped.

On July, 1482, the Christians began besieging Loja in an obvious
attempt to gain another foothold in the vega as well as encircle
ment of the capital.
slaughter.

It was a pitched battle with a great

The Christian losses were especially heavy but they

attacked again despite the heavy artillery and reinforcements the
Sultan hurried to the aid of the city.

Loja was not as strong a

fortress as Alhama but it was not surprised when it was attacked
and the Sultan was quick to relieve i t . ^
I ry

t {

^■'Sidi Hasan as cited in al-Maqqari, Mohammedan Dynasties, II, 372
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Just as Abfi-l-hasan was returning to his capital, flushed with
victory, two of his sons, Ab^ ’Abdillah, the eldest, and kbu-1hejaj Yusuf, fled to the northwest and established themselves in
Guadix (see Appendix IT.) which submitted to them.

Once more, then,

the political tranquility of the Muslim state was disturbed.
What had notivated the sons of the Sultan to break with
their father?

The question of succession had returned to plague

the state, as Abu fAldillah and his mother suspected he would be
passed over ’when the Sultan chose his successor.

Whether he

would have been so denied is unknown because the jealousy a harem
system breeds caused a break between father and son before any
decision had been made.
Abu-l-hasan had, according to Arab social custom, acquired a
harem.

The first wife, the sultana, was named Ayesha and her eldest

/

son was the Abu ’Abdillah who broke with his father and declared
himself at Guadix.
with Zoraya.

However, the Sultan had become greatly infatuated

It is not clear whether she was one of his wives or

a slave but she obviously, almost notoriously, was his favorite.^
Now the effect of this relationship on the political situation is
not certain.

Whether it was merely the jealousy of Ayesha or con

crete evidence that her son would be passed over is not clear.

It

is likely that it was a combination of both, and an explosive com
bination it was.

^Chapman, History of Spain, p. 204.
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This problem would never have presented itself if the
succession of the eldest son had been an established tradition
in Andalusia or if the harem system had not allowed such bitter
jealousies.

/
Abu ’Abdillah would then have had no doubts about

his eventual accession to the throne and Ayesha would at least
have been secure in her legal status as mother of the successor.
In a monogamous society a king may have mistresses, but the
children resulting from such an arrangement are not legitimate
heirs and the wife still has some standing.
Granada.

This was not so in

All the children of all the wives were legitimate heirs

in this system.

One wife only gained power by being the favorite

Thus, jealousy and bickering, perhaps even more destructive and
bitter among women, was rampant in the harem.
Thus it was that Abu-l-hasan?s private conduct, for example
his passion for Zoraya, contributed to his downfall as ruler of
Muslim Granada.

He was no longer the only ruler of the state.

There were, now, and for the rest of Muslim Granada’s history,
two sultans.

This is perhaps the most concrete and dangerous

manifestation of the political instability of the region.
The sultan wished to stay in Granada because he knew his
son was busy undermining the loyalty of the capital’s citizenry.
In fact, from Guadix, Abu ’Abdillah had already brought Baza and
Almeria, both in the north (see Appendix II), under his control.
af
Street disorder in Granada in Abu ’Abdillah’s favor was general.
This violence was intensified by the entrance of the tribes into
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the

d i s p u t e . ^9

The Abencerrages, anxious to avenge the massacre of

their leaders at the hand of the old Sultan, Abu-l-hasan, joined
'As son’s cause.

It was that old political mistake that returned

to plague the Sultan.

Also, the crowded nature of the small state

meant that disorder in the capital immediately affected the
provinces.

Only the extreme southern provinces were immune and

they were the ones that did not come under the young Sultan*s
control.
Moreover, the Sultan Abu-l-hasan had to defend his state
from the Christians.

The Christians attacked Velez and Malaga,

important southern cities, with an estimated 8,000

m e n . 50

So,

•s
with great trrpidati.cn, Abu-l-hasan left his capital to relieve
them.

He hoped he could defeat the Christians and return to Granada

before his son could intrigue to win the most important city of
oho state.

But, Malaga, too, was important.

It guarded the pass

that allowed supplies and, in more troubled times, men from Africa
as they had come twice before.

If the Christians pressed too hard

perhaps aid could be sought from the Berbers.
Malaga.

So, he marched to

He succeeded in his hope to defeat the ^infidels" but

his political world crumbled.
4

s
Abu ’Abdillah was able to take Granada.
4

...The Sultan Abu ’Abdillah, son of Abu-l-hasan...saw his
authority firmly established there, as well as at Almeria,
and almost every other large city with the exception of Malaga
and the western, district, which remained faithful to his father....51

^Yonge, Christians and Moors in Spain, p. 291.
5^Sidi
as cited in al-Maqqari, Mohammedan Dynasties, II, 373.
5°Sidi Hasan
1
5-Libid.
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Abu-l-hasan was forced to remain in the south.

His son proclamed

himself sultan and energetically began a campaign against his
father at Malaga in order to extend his control to the whole state.

t
Abu-l-hasan had been joined by his brother Az-zaghal who governed
I
the province of Malaga and they met Abu ’Abdillah in the west.
The latter was completely defeated and retreated to Granada.
The brothers, Abu-l-hasan and Az-zaghal, had been able to
control the southwestern province because most of its leaders had
been killed in an abortive attempt to invade Christian territory
in April, 14&3«

Together, the brothers proceeded against those

very Christians whose armed power had defeated the previous leaders.
They were moderately sucessful and gathered a rich booty.
/
Abu ’Abdillah, realizing that such victories must be matched
by him if he was to maintain the new-found loyalty of the citizenry,
/

prepared his own expedition.

At the head of his army Abu ’Abdillah

put his father-in-law Ali Atat, a ninety year old man.

They both

left for the northern frontier with the intentions of violating
Christian territory.

They did so at Lucena.

But, victory was

denied the young Sultan.
...The Christians in the neighboring districts, having assembled
under the Lord of Cabra, guarded all the mountain passes in
the rear of the Moslems, and cut them off from their country.
In this situation the Moslems were completely defeated, and
almost the whole of the army were either made prisoners or
slain. Among the former were.the Sultan himself....*

52Ibid., p. 374.
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Abu ’Abdillah was now in the hands of his enemies.
a great prize for a politically astute leader.
such a man.

It proved to be

Ferdinand II was

t
In the hands of the Christians Abu ’Abdillah was a

willing pawn.
...Though he could show true Moorish courage in the battle
field, yie was! a weak and vacillating man, and was perpetually
oppressed by tne conviction that destiny was against him....
He was ever lamenting his evil star....53
He made an agreement with Ferdinand so that with Christian aid he
could pursue hi3 right to the sultan’s throne.
often characterized as ” c

r a f t y "

Ferdinand, who is

knew well the value of such a

disruptive element in the camp of his enemies.

Still he kept his

captive for two years.
I
Meanwhile, Abu-l-hasan returned to Granada, having heard of
his son’s capture.

S
There Abu-l-hasan ruled between 1483 and 1485,

/
but his government was not stable for partisans of Abu ’Abdillah
disrupted the peace.
battles.

Eventually this disorder caused street

The war became so bitter that it caused this plea from

Imam Macu.
Why do ye strike one another like deadly enemies? For whom
do ye shed your brother’s blood?..,.Ye for a headstrong old
man, unable to wield a sword or lead you forth against the enemy;
ye for a woman-like youth, without courage, virtue or luck....
Give up both and seek among the warriors of the royal race for
one to whom you can safely entrust the safety of the kingdom.55

5^Lane-Poole, Moors. p. 246.
5^-For example, Prescott, Ferdinand and Isabella.
CC
Imam Macu as cited in Yonge, Christians and Moors in Spain, p. 266.
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The choice was Az-zaghal.

Abu-l-hasan offered no resistance to

his brother^ accession since he was old and losing his eyesight
He retired to Almunecar until his death.
During this period pressure from Christian Spain was weak;
then in 1485 the Christians invaded the territory of Malaga once
more.

Ferdinand enjoyed some successes.

He also released Abu

’Abdillah who returned to bring disruption and rebellion to the
Muslim state.

Andalus needed political cohesion so badly in the

face of the Spanish threat; but it was not to be.
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CITIZENRY

In all these political maneuverings the citizens of the
state played the arbitrators between pretenders to the throne.
Their loyalty meant victory.

If they had been consistent in that

loyalty the politics of Granada would have been greatly simplified.
But, they vacillated and therefore were accomplices to the pre
tender fs dissensions.

Many citizens in Granada had, for example,

taken up the cause of Abu ’Abdillab against his father.

They rirere

fickle for numerous r e a s o n s . T h e i r vacillations continued until
Ferdinand encamped outside the gates of the capital, having defeated
most of the fortresses of the state.
In 1485 Granada had its third ruler in four years.

Az-zaghal,

t
brother of Abu-l-hasan, had a legitimate claim to the throne through
the tribal seniority system of

succession.

57

He was proclaimed sultan

by the citizens of the capital and brought peace in the long civil
/

war between government supporters and the partisans of Abu ’Abdillah,
his nephew.

Az-zaghal was perhaps the most far-sighted of a

particularly myopic generation of political leaders.

Relative peace

was restored until Ferdinand launched his double campaign of armed
force and subversion.

i

Abu ’Abdillah was the tool of that sub-

56
See above pp. 8-11.
57See above pp. 4~5«
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version.

Ferdinand used him and his supporters to undermine

Granada’s new-found unity.
Ferdinand II began his most concerted effort to win the
state of Granada militarily.

In May or June 1485, he enjoyed his

first major success which set the pattern for the numerous victories
that were to follow.

The Christians besieged Eonda (see Appendix

II) which lay at the border of the vital southern province.

At the

time of the attack, Ronda’s forces were deployed to neighboring
villages to defend them against the imminent peril of Christians.
Ronda was weakened and Ferdinand hit her hard with artillery.
Very soon she submitted.

The pattern of Ronda’s capture was re

peated again and again.
After the surrender of Ronda, the whole of the neighboring
districts of which that city was the capital submitted to the
Christians, so that no place remained to the west of Malaga,
vrhich did not acknowledge the rule of the infidel king; who,
after distributing his army among the fortresses recently con
quered, in order that he might afterwards more effectually be
siege Malaga, returned to his dominion.5
As each major city fell to the King so did the entire area around
it; sometimes even a whole province came under his control.

Also,

as he gained one area, it gave him a base from which to attack
other cities.

The defeat of one major city was much more, than the

seizure of a fortress.

His strategy to attack the southern edge

of Granada was well-advised sines it cut off any potential aid
to the Moors from the Muslims in Africa who had twice in the

5%idi Hasan as cited in al-Maqqari, Mohammedan Dynasties. II, 375*
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history of Spain saved Islamic territory.
Ronda was the first great Christian success in the 1485
campaign which opened the final push for recovery.
the pattern of capitulation during the war.
were wise and fierce soldiers.
and won them courageously.

It demonstrated

However, the Muslims

They lost battles only tenaciously

Az-zaghal was no fool.

He knew that his

small state had to maintain its territory unviolated if it were
to survive.
Because historians know the end of this story, and because
they see that the situation of Muslim Granada was so precarious,
some tend to deemphasize the victories the Muslims enjoyed and
present the Reconquista as an unqualified success.
appears riding triumphantly from victory to victory.

Ferdinand often
The engage

ment on the frontier at Moclin (see Appendix II) on September 3>
1485 was a different story.
Az-zaghal, concerned that his southern border had been vio
lated, left the capital to inspect other fortresses in the area,
He was notified while at one of these castles that a large body of
Christian forces were near.

He prepared to engage them.

The

resulting battle, although the advantage changed hands often, was
a decisive victory for the Muslims.
and much

a r t i l l e r y .

59

The Christians lost many men

So, the Muslims also enjoyed some victories.

However, the inherent strength of the Christians was demonstrated;
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Az™zaghal could not pursue his victory because the king of Aragon
began to move his major force in.

So the Sultan had to content

himself with the spoils of the battle.

Nevertheless. Ferdinand

found in the Sultan an intelligent and courageous adversary who
could hurt him.
Ferdinand pressed the campaign hard and received its fruits
in the successive capitulation of numerous cities in the south.
...The Christian king so pressed the territory of the Moslems
on all sides, that he attacked no fortress which he did not
take, and invaded no district which did not immediately surrender
to his arms.°^
Each time a city fell, it surrounding, unprotected area capitulated
and many Muslims fled to the ci’
ties still in their coreligionist’s
hands.

This not only meant a loss of territory but the increase of

a rather tumultuous population in Muslim-occupied territory; this
had much to do with the final gasp of the Muslim state.
j
Abu ’Abdillah returned to the capital early in I486 to
demand the sultanate and disturb the domestic political situation
in Granada.

This was disasterous.

Here was a state already

losing militarily with domestic peace; now there was the added
weakness -- the fatal weakness -- of internal discord.

Ferdinand

/
sent Abu ’Abdillah into the' fray east of Baza to create a type of
second front.

He equipped the aspiring Sultan well, having

...furnished him with men, money, and other requisites, and
given him...dress of honor, fjerdinancQ sent him to the reconquest

6°lbid., p. 376.
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of all his father’s dominions. He also pledged his royal word
that whoever am^ng the Moslems would acknowledge the authority
of his ally, Abu ’Abdillah, and swear allegiance to him,
should be included in the treaty of peace existing between the
two sovereigns, and enjoy all the security and advantages
insured by the same.®-'$
So, loyalty to Abu ’Abdillah meant security from the sometimes
savage attacks of the Christians.

Very soon Velez submitted

and a suburb of the capital, Albayzin, declared for him.

This

suburb began disruptions of the city’s life with periodic attacks
of stone-throwing against the Alhambra.

This rebellion lasted

from March to June, I486.
During this period, Abu ’Abdillah took Loja, and surprisingly,
sent feelers to his uncle concerning unity.

If this unity had

materialized there might have been some hope for the Muslim state,

t
although it was already facing defeat on the battlefield,

Abu

’Abdillah proposed that he be given as a fief the city of Loja
and any other city of Az-zaghal’s choice. In exchange for such a
£
concession, Abu ’Abdillah offered to rejoin the Muslim cause in
defense of Granada against the Reconquista.

Before such negotiations

$

had proceeded far toward agreement, Abu ’Abdillah’s fortress of
Loja came under heavy attack from his former captor.

He put up

a stubborn struggle but there was no aid from his fellow Muslims
because of political jealousies and suspicions.
The people of Granada, however, and those of other places,
fearing lest the siege of Loxa fsicl should only be a strategem
of the enemy, never went to the relief of that city. The

6lIbid.
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Christians in the meantime pressed the siege with increased
vigor.^2
On May 23, I486, the city fell and Abu tAbdillah once more knew
the undesired hospitality of the Christian enemy.
The price of his freedom the first time meant nothing too
distasteful to him; merely the pursuit of what he considered his
rightful political power even if it did mean discord which aided
the enemy.

This time, to escape Ferdinand cost expensive con

cessions.

He agreed to turn the Alhambra over to the King when

he gained control of it if Ferdinand defeated Az-zaghal.

So, once

f
more Abu tAbdilla’
n returned to Muslim Granada.

Once more he

offered those who would honor him with their loyalty security
against the Christians since Ferdinand promised to avoid confront
ation with cities under his protection.
clared for him again.

The suburb Albayzin de

No other city would do so because such

promises of security had not saved Loja; Ferdinand attacked it
because of the young Sultan’s negotiations with Az-zaghal.
Abu ’Abdillah entered the Albayzin on October 17, I486.

So,

Inevit

ably, a civil war commenced that lasted until January 24, 1487.
It was bloody.

At that time the citizens of Granada fought in the

streets with the citizens of the Albayzin but the battles were
indecisive.

Nevertheless, this in-fighting gave Ferdinand a

decided advantage in his campaign by diverting Muslim attention
from his progress in the field.

62Ibid., p. 377.
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Az-zaghal, no doubt realizing that the Muslim cause could
ill-afford more divisiveness, convoked the major members of the
provincial aristocracy to agree to a compact of unity.

This was

done and hope still glimmered that Muslim Granada might preserve
some corner of Spain they could call Andalus.

But unity was more

easily found in the leadership than in the population.

This show

§
of unity understandably frightened Abu ’Abdillah whose fidelity
to the Muslim cause was less than perfect.

He realized his

precarious position in the capital so near the newly-strengthened
Sultan, so he hurried to the southern provinces where he could
find a more strategically advantageous fortress.

With tales of

Christian vengence, which were not totally untrue, and his agreeM
ment with Ferdinand, Abu ’Abdillah won the allegiance of all the
major cities in the area except Velez.

Very soon the Christians

were besieging that city.
Az-zaghal, mindful of the importance of the Velez-Malaga
area, which meant contact with potential African aid, hurried to
the relief of the city even though he realized that leaving the
capital unprotected was dangerous to his regime.

The strategic im

portance of the area overcame other considerations; just as it had

/

for Abu-l-hasan when he left the city and his son usurped the throne.
This defense of the welfare of the state was uncommon in the later
stages of Muslim Granada.

Az-zaghal sent an advance force of

cavalry to the area, but the fate of these troops demonstrates the
most obvious damage that internal discord can bring to a state in war.
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A body of cavalry, which El Zagal ^*sicj dispatched from G-uadix
to throw succors into the beleaguered city, was encountered and
cut to pieces by a superior force of the young king Abdallah
fsic\ o « o «
Here we see a race, a religion and a state in mortal struggle against
a determined and recently successful enemy, plagued with leaders
who fight each other rather than the common foe.

/
Perhaps Abu

Abdillah’s act is understood when it is remembered that the sultans
saw their states as personal estates to do with as they pleased.
To the young Sultan there was very little difference between
Ferdinand and Az-zaghal since both threatened his inheritance.
He had little sense of the state outside of his personal ambitions.
To him these disorders threatened only him, not Muslim presence
in Spain or Muslim in Christian territory.
/
Nevertheless, Abu ’Abdillah’s action, in fact his very
presence, materially weakened the Muslim cause by splitting the
state’s unity.

Az-zaghal now left the capital at the head of a

large force to relieve Velez.

He met with no success.

retreated before the Christian troops.
ing to find security in the capital.

His forces

He fled northward expect
His refuge did not remain

open to him
...The tidings of his disaster had preceded him. The fickle
populace, with whom misfortune passes for misconduct...hastened
to transfer their allegiance to his rival ^Abu ’AbdillahJ.•••
The population, so important in the politics of Muslim

^Prescott, Ferdinand and Isabella. II, 24-25•
% b i d .. p. 14.
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society, could have been the cement for a solid political structure.
But, as they demonstrated on Az-zaghal’s return to the capital,
their loyalty was easily alienated and their allegiance cheaply
bought.

The population was pleased only by victories.

They were

impatient and unwilling to make the necessary sacrifices to
achieve those victories.

In Granada, now the last large city not

under Christian control or in danger of falling, they were crowded
and poor and thus discontent.

They, therefore, allowed their

allegiance to swing from one leader to another, thus prolonging and
intensifying dynastic quarrels.

The nature of these citizens is

best demonstrated when they closed the gates of the city on the
returning Az-zaghal, their most capable leader, and his army simply
because he had been defeated in one battle.

The citizens of the

4
city now declared for Abu<- fAbdillah.
Az-zaghal fell victim to this tumultuous population which
denied him his throne.

The people of Velez heard of the coup at

Granada and knew there would be no aid; so they capitulated.

The

next point of contact was the vitally important city of Malaga.
Az-zaghal, who had fled to the eastern cities, made some las des
perate attempts by calling for aid from the African Muslims. ^

Aid

from them did not come; they were busy with their own warfare.
But, Granada was too close to total defeat to be really helped by
such an invasion.
might have helped.

Perhaps if they had been asked sooner the Berbers
However, the previous invasions meant severe

^Hitti, Arabs, p. 554*
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occupation forces especially in terms of religious orthodoxy, for
Andalus and the Moors felt themselves caught between two evils:
Christian and Berber.

Az-zaghal had no resource to stop the violence

that broke over the second most important city of Granada.
Ferdinand first tried to bribe the governor of Malaga to
submit, but he found that all the courage and dignity of the Muslim
had not been destroyed in domestic dissension.

The governor replied;

nMy countrymen have shown by choosing me that they think me worthy.
Thou wouldst make me base."^

But, the city fell and many after it.

The next important city to fall was Baza, northeast of the
capital.

In 1489, it was besieged.

It held out valiantly but

Ferdinand had one more trick to spring on the Muslims.

Baza

girded itself because it hoped that the coming winter would force
the Christians to retreat to Aragon.

Rather than wintering in

Christian Spain as he had done so before, Ferdinand built a sub
stantial city outside the walls of Baza.

Such a strategy threw

the inhabitants of the city into consternation and they capitulated.
He was less generous than in other conquered cities, expelling all
the Muslims there.

They fled to the capital.

Seeing that Granada was doomed, Az-zaghal made his submission
with typical Muslim fatalism.
What Allah wills, He brings to pass in His own way.

Had He

^Yonge, Christians and Moors in Spain, p. 272.
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not decreed the fall of Granada, this good sword might have
saved it; but His will be done.°'
The area surrounding Guadix in which he had established himself after
being denied entrance to the capital, submitted with him..

Ferdinand

held the southern and eastern provinces and only the capital, its
suburbs and the valley over which it looked, remained in Muslim
hands.

Az—zaghal v.ras given a small fief southwest of Malaga.

ultimate fate is in question.

His

One author^ claims that he eventually

left for Africa where the Berbers disinherited him and put his eyes
out.

However, other authors have not mentioned this and the fate

of Az-zaghal is unclear.

He was, no doubt, the most capable Muslim

leader of the era, but he fell prey to the forces and men who created
domestic havoc.

He was basically a victim of an inconstant citizenry

that failed to recognize his ability and its danger.
Almost ten years after Spanish forces began a concentrated
military effort to complete Christian.hegenomy in the Iberian
peninsula, Ferdinand and his army encamped on the fertile Vega
valley within the protecting Alpuxarras mountains, to begin the
siege of the capital and the last stronghold of the Moors.

The

campaign had not been continuous, as few wars were, especially the
Reconquista.

Except for the winter siege of 1489 that won Baza

for the Christian forces, Ferdinand spent his winters in his own
6*7
Prescott, Ferdinand and Isabella, II, 69.
^%erriman, The Spanish Empire, II, 71-72.
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kingdom.

Christian military strategy was to surround and cut off

the Alhambra and then starve it into submission.

This plan was

accomplished not without some stubborn resistance from many cities
in Andalus.
However, there was a second and more damaging front to the
Granadine wars.
of his enemy.

Ferdinand knew the value of quarreling in the camp
The plan was born of his acute perception of the

single, yet lethal, defect in the state of Granada.

He handled

/

the two incidents in which Abu ’Abdillah was his prisoner to
increase such dissension.

Ferdinand’s political campaign was as

successful as his military strategy.

Ferdinand’s policy played on

the weakness in Muslim culture, especially Andalusian culture which
lacked cohesion because of the myriad forces that bred political
instability.
There was one last moment of victory for the Muslim cause
which may explain•the increased courage to defend the Alhambra in
its last months.

Ferdinand, returning from garrisoning newly-

conquered cities around Granada in preparation for the siege of
I
the capital, entered the Vega and demanded the submission of Abu
’Abdillah and control of the city.
not submit.

The citizens of the city did

True to his threat, Ferdinand destroyed the crops and

g
left Andalus for the winter.

While the Christians were gone, Abu

’Abdillah took the opportunity to try to destroy some of the enemy
fortresses that encircled the city of Granada.

His army marched

into the Alpuxarras mountains to demand the cities there return
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to the Muslim fold, which they quickly did.

If this had not happen

ed the eventual siege of seven months at the Alhambra would have
been shortened, since the Alpuxarras mountain range served as a
supply route during that period.

i
Abu ’Abdillah continued a

successful campaign until spring when Ferdinand returned and the
Sultan was forced to retreat to Granada while the Christians
repaired what strategic positions they could.
Muslim attempt to regain lost territory.

This was the last

Mow Abu ’Abdillah con

cerned himself with the defense of a capital crowded with Muslim
exiles.
On March 22, 1491, Ferdinand began a seven month siege which
pressed the people of Granada hard, but they hoped the Christians
would return to Christian Spain for the xvinter; supplies still
came from the Alpuxarras so conditions were not as yet desperate.
By November, large numbers of Muslims were fleeing the cits'- and,
for the most part, leaving Spain, but no definite decision on
f.
military strategy was made by Abu ’Abdillah and his advisors
becuase they pinned their hopes on the departure of Christian
forces for the vrinter.

It liras a false hope that the incident at

Baza should have shown them would not materialize.
Soon it became obvious that Ferdinand had no intention of
leaving until he could rule the city from the Alhambra.

The

Vizier, as the Sultan’s advisor, explained the situation to him:
There are sufficient provisions for a few months' supply,,
independent of what might exist in the possession of merchants,
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and other rich inhabitants. But of what avail...is a temporary
provision against the sieges of the Christians, which are inter
minable? The number (of men capable of bearing armsj is great
but what can be expected from mere citizen soldiers? They vaunt
and menace in time of safety. None are so arrogant when the
enemy is at a distance but when the din of war thunders at
their gates, they hide themselves in t e r r o r . 6 9
The general, Musa, spoke for a glorious defense that would befit
an Arab and in defense of the citizen soldier the Vizier had maligned.
What reason have we...to depair? The blood of those illustrious
Moors, the ancient conquerors of Spain, still flows in our veins.
Let us be true to ourselves and fortune will again be with us.
We have a veteran force, both horse and foot, the flower of our
chivalry seasoned in war, and scarred in a thousand battles. As
to the multitude of citizens, spoken of so slightly, why should
we doubt their valour? There are 20,000 young men, in the fire
of youth, for whom I will engage...in the defense of their h o m e . . . . 70
This debate within the council was also carried on among the citizenry
who feared for their lives and sent a representative to the Sultan
to plead for surrender:
The Christians are daily receiving reenforcements, while we have
none to expect; we all thought and expected that, at the approach
of winter, the Christians would have raised the siege and retired
to their country, whereas our hopes have completely failed; they
have built a town in front of our city and pressed the siege
closer than before. We ought, therefore, to provide for our
safety and that of our c h i l d r e n . 71
It was decided that capitulation should be made.

The negotiations

over terms began.

69Abul Casim Abdelmelic, Vizier of Granada as cited in, Bharagava,
Islamic Culture and Institutions. p. 180.
7 %eneral Musa as cited in Ibid.

rp’j 8 2
«®
'xSidi Hasan as cited in al-Maqqari, Mohammedan Dynasties. II, 387.
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Ferdinand had, in I486, offered Abu ’Abdillah a large estate
in Andalus if he would put the capital in his hands after the defeat
of Az-zaghal.

Because the Sultan did not do so, he lost the chance

for a favorable peace for himself.
of the treaty were not harsh.

Even now, though, the terms

It guaranteed the integrity of Islam

and allowed no legal distinction between Moor and Spaniard.

Promises

were given by the Christians that no punishment for acts during the
war would be meted out, for example, no Moor could be punished for
the death of a Christian during the

siege.

to swear to uphold its provisions.

Thus, on November 25, 1491 the

capitulation was signed.

72

Ferdinand was required

There was much sorrow in Granada and

only the stubborn general remained defiant.
Let us show ourselves as men, by shedding not tears, but blood
to the last drop. I will lead you to find on the battlefield
either independence or an honorable death....73
It was not until January 3, 1492, that the city actually
left Muslim hands.

/

Abu ’Abdillah and his retinue rode out of the

capital to the encampment of the Christians where he gave the keys
of Granada to Ferdinand.
These keys...are the last relics of the Arabian empire in Spain.
Thine, 0 king are our trophies, our kingdom, and our person.
Such is the will of GodI Receive them with the clemency thou

^Henry Charles Lea. The Moriscos of Spain (Philadelphia: Lea
Brothers and Co., 1901), pp. 20-21.
^General Musa as cited in Yonge, Christians and Moors in Spain.
pp. 290-91.
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hast promised, and which we look for at thy hands.^
He then rode away from the capital he defended so inadequately and
out of the state his pride and greed had done so much to destroy.
He paused at the highest point of the mountain which is called
in Spanish tales ’’The Last Sigh of the Moors."

I
Abu ’Abdillah is

supposed to have cried at the sight of his lost city.

His mother,

who had begun the great dynastic struggle in her son’s youth, had
little sympathy for him.

"You do well, to weep like a woman for

what you could not defend like a

manl"?5

Abtf ’Abdillah stayed for

some time in the Alpuxarras but eventually went to Africa where he
died in battle serving an African relative.

An Arab chronicler

comments:
Wretched man who could lose his life in another’s cause, though
he. did not dare to die in his ownl Such was the immutable decree
of destiny. Blessed be Allah, who exalteth and debaseth the
kings of the earth, according to His divine \*ill, in whose
fulfillment consists that eternal justice which regulates all
human affairs.?®
Thus was the end of Andalus and all its leaders.

The terms of the

treaty were not fairly met and soon forced conversions and bookburnings were common.
Granada was the last Islamic state in the Iberian peninsula.
And yet, despite Muslim glorification of war and undoubted valor in
ryi £
' A b u ’Abdillah as cited in Morais, Historical Tales. pp. 146-47.
?5Ayesha as cited in Prescott, Ferdinand and Isabella. II, 98.
?^An Arab chronicler as cited in Ibid., pp. 98-99.
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battle, it died with little more than a whimper.
military strategy and a strong army aided the foe,

Intelligent
Something other

than the military defeated Granada and it was largely political
instability.

Domestic division was a manifestation of Islamic

political and cultural organization.

The sultan, whose powers were

absolute, knew no concept of the public welfare.

The submission

he demanded from his subjects was too demeaning for the prideful
tribes who warred among themselves and with the ruler.

Two systems

of succession complicated the transfer of power so that often the
state had two rulers contending for power.

Culturally, the harem

fostered jealousies that flared into political division while
Arabic culture sanctioned war as a means to solve the split.

Sub

jects of this state became the final arbitrators between contenders,
but they were fickle and capricious because of their economic,
religious and social alienation from the ruling class.

All these

facets have been shown to cause the political instability which
mortally weakened the state.

They worked to make the wars between

father and son and uncle and nephew possible and the pressure from
Christian Spain lethal.

A determined and loyal population could

have saved political tranquility but the pattern of Islamic culture
made that possibility remote.

These people were the final and

ultimate source of legitimacy for the sultans and their vacillations
allowed domestic strife*

As once they had fought each other while

Ferdinand marched toward them, now they could only wait and hope
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their Christian conquerors would be kind.
There was crying in Granada when the sun was going down;
Some calling on the Trinity -- some calling on Mahoun.
Here passed away the Koran —
there in the Cross was borne -—
And here was heard the Christian bell —
and there the Moorish horn.''

^Spanish ballad as cited in Lane-Poole, Moors in Spain, p. 267.
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